Collapse the dual permission stack into one policy. The runtime-side
ToolPermissionResolver (own safe lists, own grant memory, bypassed the
ApprovalEngine whenever it said ALLOW) is deleted; runtime_v2 now consults
ApprovalEngine.predict(), a synchronous fast path reading the same config
and the same persisted allowlist as the async authorize pipeline, so a
grant given anywhere is honored everywhere. permissions.py keeps only a
policy-free adapter; the duplicated permissions_v2 config fields and the
runtime grant persistence loop are removed (stale YAML keys are ignored).
New shell_safety module becomes the single source of truth for shell
classification: flag-audited read-only commands (awk/od/jq/sed -n/diff/
git subcommand table/... auto-allow; find -delete, sort -o, curl -o/-d,
rg --pre still prompt even when the bare name is config-listed),
keyword-aware compound splitting (loop/branch headers no longer poison
grants), expansion-safe $() handling, and fail-closed treatment of
anything unparseable or substitution-bearing.
Grant semantics are rebuilt around derived word-boundary prefixes:
"python3 -c" instead of token bags, interpreter -c/-m kept in the prefix,
bash/eval/sudo never grantable as prefixes, read-only segments exempt
from the every-candidate-must-match rule so a granted command chained
with ls/echo verification passes, and approve-once now records the exact
candidates as a session grant so identical re-runs stop re-prompting.
The authorize heuristic also audits the original command text instead of
the quote-dropping preview (echo "<EOF>" no longer reads as redirection).
Validated live on zz_perm_probe1 (native minimal org): awk/od/ls/cat/
sha256sum ran with zero cards, python3 -c parked once and three different
python3 -c commands then passed via the persisted prefix grant, and an
agent-issued rm -f compound correctly re-prompted showing only the
segments needing approval. Full suite failures are byte-identical to the
pre-change HEAD baseline (27 pre-existing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Approval friction (harmless commands kept prompting):
- Persist "Allow for this session" grants to approval_allowlist.yaml under a
new sessions scope (capped LRU), hydrated lazily, so they survive `opc ui`
restarts and re-entering the session instead of living only in memory.
- Safe-prefix matching now accepts compound read-only commands: every segment
must match a safe prefix, and fd-duplication / /dev/null redirections
(2>&1, 2>/dev/null) no longer disqualify a command; real write redirections
(>, >>, <) still do. Default safe prefixes gain common read-only commands
(cd, cat, head, grep, git log, ...).
- First-use approval now gates only MEDIUM+ risk; heuristically LOW actions
proceed without a card.
- Shell-substitution detection flags eval/source only at command position of a
segment (no more false positives on `grep source file`); $(...) and
backticks still flag anywhere.
Approval card timeout redesign (deferred decisions):
- The card's structured approval context (action, allowlist patterns, scopes)
now travels through the escalation event into the persisted card metadata.
- Timeout without a default action no longer marks the card timed out, and the
session-detail reconciler no longer stales deferred-capable cards: the card
stays pending and clickable indefinitely, including across restarts.
- Clicking after the inline wait expired applies the allowlist grant
(approve-once grants the exact command at session scope), resolves the card,
and rewrites the reply to target the parked AWAITING_HUMAN checkpoint so the
task resumes through the normal message pipeline and the retried command
auto-approves. With no parked checkpoint the grant still lands and a helper
reply explains the state.
Verified: approval engine suite (40) incl. new deferred-decision and
compound-command tests, ws_handler + runtime suites green, real escalated
commands from project 999 replayed against the user's config now auto-approve
while pip install / $(...) / rm -rf / write redirects still prompt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- get_context_window() now reads litellm.get_model_info().max_input_tokens
instead of get_max_tokens(), which returns the output cap and severely
under-reported the window for every mapped model (e.g. deepseek 8k vs 1M)
- models litellm cannot map fall back to 128000 with a single warning per
model instead of warning on every call and returning None
- raise LLMConfig.max_tokens default 8192 -> 32768 to match the template
- README: configure the API key directly in llm_config.yaml; document
max_tokens / context_window in the example
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
LZH-YS1998