Only reap browsers that have sent at least one `system.heartbeat`.
A pre-heartbeat extension never opts in, so it is never dropped on
silence and keeps relying on socket-close detection exactly as before.
This removes a backward-compat regression where a new daemon paired
with an old extension would wrongly reap a live-but-idle connection
and then report `no_browser_connected` on the next command.
- Add a `heartbeat_seen` flag to `BrowserClient`, set when a heartbeat
event arrives, and exclude never-heartbeated clients from
`stale_browsers`.
- Cover both the opt-in and the legacy-survivor cases in unit tests.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Introduce a `system.heartbeat` protocol event and use it as a
liveness signal on the daemon side.
- Track `last_seen` per connected browser, bumped on every inbound
WS frame (tool response, event, ping/pong, or heartbeat).
- Add a reaper task that drops any browser silent past a 60s window
and purges its sessions, mirroring the WS disconnect cleanup. This
releases half-open connections left behind when the OS resumes from
sleep and kills the service worker without delivering a close frame,
so the daemon no longer pins a phantom "connected" browser and can
idle-exit normally.
- Wire the reaper into both the foreground daemon and the test/embed
entry point, aborting it on shutdown.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The daemon dispatched inbound `session.window_closed` and
`session.user_interrupt` events using only the payload — the sending
browser's identity was never checked against the session's owner.
Any connected extension could therefore emit window_closed with
another browser's session_id to tear down its session (forgetting it,
dropping its tool queue + interrupt marker), or emit user_interrupt
to cancel every inflight tool of another browser's session and arm
its interrupt marker. This is a cross-tenant integrity/DoS hole that
is exploitable even between two legitimate extensions, independent of
the (separately tracked) WS Origin allow-list gap.
Thread the sender's BrowserId (already in scope as `client.id` in
handle_inbound_text) into both handlers and ignore the event when the
named session is live and owned by a different browser. A session
that is already gone is left to the existing no-op forget path.
Adds four ownership tests (owner honoured / non-owner ignored for each
event); updated two existing tests for the new signature. Full bsk
suite green (165 lib + integration), no new clippy warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ljy-0827