merge #182: trust-fence Origin hostname compare for Edge 151 (MXY)
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+8
-1
@@ -67,10 +67,17 @@ export function isTrustedApiRequest(request: ApiTrustRequest, trustedHosts: read
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if (hostUrl === undefined) return false
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if (!isLoopbackHostname(hostUrl.hostname) && !isTrustedAuthority(hostUrl, trustedHosts)) return false
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if (header(request.headers, 'sec-fetch-site') === 'cross-site') return false
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// Origin fence: when a browser attaches an Origin it must name this
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// hostname (the Host fence above already bound the authority, so the port
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// must not re-decide trust). Comparing hostname, not host: some Chromium
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// builds (Edge 151) serialize the Origin of a non-default-port loopback page
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// without the port, and refusing those bricks every /sidebar route. Absent
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// Origin is fine — the Host fence above already bound the request. The
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// literal "null" (sandboxed iframes, file: pages) is an opaque origin, refused.
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const origin = header(request.headers, 'origin')
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if (origin === undefined) return true
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try {
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return new URL(origin).host === hostUrl.host
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return new URL(origin).hostname === hostUrl.hostname
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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