Files
apes-sidebar/src/client/BrowserView.tsx
T
HuanLinOTO 699ce448a1 fix: 处理 Copilot 二轮 review 的 10 条评论
- BrowserView: 即使 host 在白名单,GUI 自身 origin 永不给 allow-same-origin(裸 host 条目覆盖所有端口时可提权)
- intercept: revealInExplorer 相对路径经 resolveSidebarPath 解析后再 revealPaths(交付物路径是相对的)
- intercept: ctx.betterSidebar 改为 ctx.get(#357 纤维链读取约定)
- FileTree/EditorHost/TreePanel/tabs: 把 revealed 贯通到树行渲染 + 高亮类 + scrollIntoView(此前高亮永不渲染)
- state.revealPaths: 重建祖先目录时保留前导分隔符(POSIX/UNC 此前目录永远折叠)
- state.schedulePersist: 仅活动会话写入全局宽度(targeted open 不再用非活动会话的过期宽度覆盖拖拽值)
- browser.probe: GET 回退显式取消 body(否则流式/大响应挂住 socket)
- terminal-font: leading generic 前只放 symbols-only 字体;fully-patched 放 generic 后(避免 hijack 度量字体)
- sidebar.module.css: 恢复拖拽反馈(#130 的 silent resize 与 PR 描述冲突,取 HEAD)
- Sidebar: 剩余 4 处 ctx.betterSidebar 改 ctx.get
- tests: 补 revealPaths/iframeSandboxFor/terminal-font 回归测试 + EditorHost/FileTree 测试补 revealed prop
2026-08-24 18:40:04 +08:00

290 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* The built-in browser tab: an address bar plus a sandboxed iframe.
*
* Security model (see browser.ts + the sandbox tokens below): the iframe is
* ALWAYS sandboxed without `allow-same-origin` (opaque origin — the visited
* page can never sit on the GUI's origin, read its storage, or reach
* /sidebar/api) and without `allow-top-navigation` (a page must not hijack
* the GUI). The address bar only accepts http(s) and refuses loopback /
* the GUI's own origin. The side card setting "关闭浏览器沙箱" drops the
* sandbox attribute entirely for fully trusted sites — the visited page then
* runs with the GUI's own origin and full session access, so a persistent
* warning bar renders while it is off.
*
* The URL is persisted onto the tab (path/title via the patchTab reducer)
* so a reload restores the visited page; the back/forward stack only tracks
* address-bar navigations (in-frame link clicks are cross-origin and
* invisible — a documented limitation).
*/
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import {
IconChevronLeftOutline14,
IconChevronRightOutline14,
IconLinkOutline14,
IconRefreshOutline14,
IconWarningOutline16,
} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-ui-primitives'
import { VscLinkExternal } from 'react-icons/vsc'
import { api } from './api.ts'
import { embeddabilityOf, isAllowedLoopbackUrl, normalizeBrowserUrl } from './browser.ts'
import { patchTab } from './state.ts'
import { SandboxStatusBar } from './SandboxStatusBar.tsx'
import { t } from './locales.ts'
import type { TabComponentProps } from './service.ts'
import css from './sidebar.module.css'
/**
* The browser iframe sandbox tokens. NO allow-same-origin (opaque origin —
* no GUI storage/API access), NO allow-top-navigation (a browsed page must
* not hijack the GUI). allow-forms/allow-popups/allow-downloads/allow-modals
* keep login flows working; allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox lets OAuth
* popups open as normal tabs (they are cross-origin to the GUI either way).
*/
export const BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX =
'allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-downloads allow-modals allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox'
/** allow-same-origin appended for explicitly allowlisted local addresses. */
const BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX_SAME_ORIGIN =
`${BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX} allow-same-origin`
/**
* The sandbox tokens for one URL: allowlisted loopback addresses (local dev
* servers the user explicitly trusts) additionally get `allow-same-origin`
* so Vite/module/HMR pipelines that need a real origin work; every other
* site keeps the opaque-origin sandbox. `allow-same-origin` does NOT give
* the page access to the GUI — it stays cross-origin to it and to every
* other site — but it does give it its OWN origin privileges (localStorage,
* fetch without CORS), so it is only granted for the explicit allowlist.
*
* The GUI itself is the one hard exception: even when its own host is
* allowlisted (a bare-host entry covers every port, so the GUI origin
* matches), a page at the GUI's exact origin must never get
* `allow-same-origin` — that would make it same-origin with its parent and
* hand it the GUI's storage/API (and the ability to shed the sandbox). The
* GUI keeps the opaque-origin sandbox no matter what the allowlist says.
*/
export function iframeSandboxFor(url: string | undefined, allowedLoopback: string, selfOrigin?: string): string | undefined {
if (url === undefined) return undefined
if (selfOrigin !== undefined) {
let parsed: URL
try {
parsed = new URL(url)
} catch {
return BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX
}
if (parsed.origin === selfOrigin) return BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX
}
return isAllowedLoopbackUrl(url, allowedLoopback)
? BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX_SAME_ORIGIN
: BROWSER_IFRAME_SANDBOX
}
export function BrowserView(props: TabComponentProps) {
const { store, tab } = props
// The current address (initialized from the persisted tab.path so a
// reload restores the visited page).
const [url, setUrl] = useState<string | undefined>(tab.path)
const [input, setInput] = useState<string>(tab.path ?? '')
/** Blocked/invalid hint shown under the address bar (null = none). */
const [message, setMessage] = useState<string | null>(null)
/** Address-bar navigation history (in-frame clicks are not tracked). */
const [history, setHistory] = useState<string[]>(tab.path !== undefined ? [tab.path] : [])
const [cursor, setCursor] = useState<number>(tab.path !== undefined ? 0 : -1)
/** Bumped on reload to remount the iframe (also remounts on sandbox flip). */
const [reloadKey, setReloadKey] = useState(0)
/** TEMPORARY sandbox unlock for THIS surface only (never writes the global
* side card setting; lasts until the tab unmounts or the user restores). */
const [localUnlock, setLocalUnlock] = useState(false)
const noSandbox = store.getPrefs().browserNoSandbox === true || localUnlock
/** A site that refuses to be embedded (X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors):
* the probe verdict shown instead of the blank iframe. */
const [embedBlocked, setEmbedBlocked] = useState<string | null>(null)
/** The user asked to load the refused site anyway (keeps the plain iframe). */
const [forceEmbed, setForceEmbed] = useState(false)
// Probe every navigation (address bar, history, restored path): when the
// target forbids embedding, show the reason + open-in-browser instead of
// the browser's cryptic "refused to connect" blank frame. A failed probe
// (unreachable) keeps the plain iframe.
useEffect(() => {
if (url === undefined) return
let cancelled = false
setEmbedBlocked(null)
setForceEmbed(false)
void api.browserProbe(url).then((probe) => {
if (!cancelled && embeddabilityOf(probe) === 'blocked') setEmbedBlocked(url)
}).catch(() => { /* unreachable: keep the plain iframe */ })
return () => { cancelled = true }
}, [url])
const persist = (nextUrl: string): void => {
let host = nextUrl
try { host = new URL(nextUrl).hostname } catch { /* keep the URL as title */ }
store.reduce(state => patchTab(state, tab.id, { path: nextUrl, title: host }))
}
const navigateTo = (raw: string): void => {
const result = normalizeBrowserUrl(raw, window.location.origin, store.getPrefs().browserAllowedLoopback)
if (result.kind === 'ok') {
const next = result.url
setUrl(next)
setInput(next)
setMessage(null)
// Push onto the stack, dropping any stale forward entries.
setHistory(previous => [...previous.slice(0, cursor + 1), next])
setCursor(previous => previous + 1)
setReloadKey(key => key + 1)
persist(next)
return
}
setMessage(result.kind === 'invalid'
? t('browserInvalid')
: result.reason === 'scheme' ? t('browserBlockedScheme')
: t('browserBlockedLoopback'))
}
const goBack = (): void => {
if (cursor <= 0) return
const next = history[cursor - 1]!
setCursor(cursor - 1)
setUrl(next)
setInput(next)
setReloadKey(key => key + 1)
}
const goForward = (): void => {
if (cursor >= history.length - 1) return
const next = history[cursor + 1]!
setCursor(cursor + 1)
setUrl(next)
setInput(next)
setReloadKey(key => key + 1)
}
return (
<div className={css.browser}>
<div className={css.browserBar}>
<button
type="button"
className={css.iconButton}
aria-label={t('browserBack')}
title={t('browserBack')}
disabled={cursor <= 0}
onClick={goBack}
>
<IconChevronLeftOutline14 />
</button>
<button
type="button"
className={css.iconButton}
aria-label={t('browserForward')}
title={t('browserForward')}
disabled={cursor >= history.length - 1}
onClick={goForward}
>
<IconChevronRightOutline14 />
</button>
<button
type="button"
className={css.iconButton}
aria-label={t('refresh')}
title={t('refresh')}
onClick={() => { setReloadKey(key => key + 1) }}
>
<IconRefreshOutline14 />
</button>
<input
className={css.browserInput}
value={input}
placeholder={t('browserPlaceholder')}
spellCheck={false}
onChange={event => { setInput(event.target.value) }}
onKeyDown={event => {
if (event.key === 'Enter') navigateTo(input)
}}
/>
<button
type="button"
className={css.iconButton}
aria-label={t('browserGo')}
title={t('browserGo')}
onClick={() => { navigateTo(input) }}
>
<IconLinkOutline14 />
</button>
<button
type="button"
className={css.iconButton}
aria-label={t('browserOpenExternal')}
title={t('browserOpenExternal')}
disabled={url === undefined}
onClick={() => {
if (url !== undefined) window.open(url, '_blank', 'noopener')
}}
>
<VscLinkExternal size={15} />
</button>
</div>
{message !== null && <div className={css.browserMessage}>{message}</div>}
<SandboxStatusBar
sandboxed={!noSandbox}
local={localUnlock}
dangerCopy={t('browserNoSandboxWarning')}
onUnlock={() => { setLocalUnlock(true) }}
onRestore={() => { setLocalUnlock(false) }}
/>
{url === undefined ? (
<div className={css.browserStart}>{t('browserStart')}</div>
) : embedBlocked !== null && !forceEmbed ? (
<BrowserEmbedBlocked
url={embedBlocked}
onOpenInBrowser={() => { window.open(embedBlocked, '_blank', 'noopener') }}
onLoadAnyway={() => { setForceEmbed(true) }}
/>
) : (
<iframe
key={`${reloadKey}:${noSandbox ? 'ns' : 'sb'}`}
className={css.browserFrame}
src={url}
sandbox={noSandbox ? undefined : iframeSandboxFor(url, store.getPrefs().browserAllowedLoopback, window.location.origin)}
referrerPolicy="no-referrer"
allow=""
title={url}
/>
)}
</div>
)
}
/**
* The embed-refusal panel: shown when the probed site forbids being
* displayed inside other pages (X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors) — the
* iframe would only show the browser's "refused to connect" blank. Explains
* the reason and offers the real-browser open plus a load-anyway escape.
* Exported so the copy and the actions are testable without a DOM.
*/
export function BrowserEmbedBlocked(props: {
url: string
onOpenInBrowser: () => void
onLoadAnyway: () => void
}) {
const { url, onOpenInBrowser, onLoadAnyway } = props
let host = url
try { host = new URL(url).hostname } catch { /* keep the raw URL */ }
return (
<div className={css.browserBlocked}>
<IconWarningOutline16 size={16} />
<div className={css.browserBlockedTitle}>{t('browserEmbedBlocked', { host })}</div>
<div className={css.browserBlockedDesc}>{t('browserEmbedBlockedDesc')}</div>
<div className={css.browserBlockedActions}>
<button type="button" className={css.browserBlockedButton} onClick={onOpenInBrowser}>
{t('browserOpenExternal')}
</button>
<button type="button" className={css.browserBlockedButton} onClick={onLoadAnyway}>
{t('browserEmbedAnyway')}
</button>
</div>
</div>
)
}