Menghuan1918
302c20109f
- html viewer：.html/.htm 沙箱 iframe 预览（相对资源经 /sidebar/html 路径编码路由加载，CSP sandbox + 信任围栏 + cwd 边界），预览/编辑切换 - browser tab：+ 菜单多开（browser:<n>），地址栏后退/前进/刷新/在浏览器中打开（15px 图标），URL 与标题按会话持久化（patchTab + nextBrowser） - 安全：iframe 一律不透明源沙箱（无 allow-same-origin/top-navigation、no-referrer、权限策略全禁、禁 srcdoc）；地址栏仅 http(s)、拒绝 localhost 等本机地址；界面实时沙箱状态（关闭红色警示）+ 临时解锁/恢复 - 设置：htmlViewerNoSandbox / htmlViewerDefaultUnsafe / browserNoSandbox / browserInterceptLinks 四个声明式二级设置（默认安全） - 外链拦截：聊天/界面 http(s) 外链默认在侧边栏打开（openTab seed.url），Ctrl/Cmd 点击放行 - 嵌入拒绝面板：browser.probe 路由探测 X-Frame-Options/frame-ancestors，被拒站点显示原因 + 在浏览器中打开/仍然加载 - 设置页可滚动；内置 7 tab + 9 viewer；新增设计文档；268 个测试全绿
67 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Chat/GUI external-link interception: clicking an http(s) link that points
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* OUTSIDE the GUI (chat messages, tool rows, prose mentions) opens the
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* sidebar browser instead of a new browser tab. Gated by BOTH the
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* `browserInterceptLinks` pref and the browser tab's enable switch; a
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* Ctrl/Cmd/Shift/Alt-modified click always bypasses the takeover so the
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* user can still force a real browser tab.
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*
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* Only the GUI's OWN document is watched — links inside the browser tab's
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* sandboxed iframe live in another document and never bubble here (and
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* their clicks must keep working inside the sidebar).
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*/
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/** The pure decision: the URL to open in the sidebar, or null to let the
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* click fall through. Extracted so the policy is unit-testable without a
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* DOM. `anchorHref` must be the ABSOLUTE href (`<a>.href` already is). */
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export function shouldInterceptLink(anchorHref: string, selfOrigin: string): string | null {
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let url: URL
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try {
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url = new URL(anchorHref)
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return null
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// Same-origin links are GUI-internal navigation (settings pages, tool
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// docs) — never routed into the sidebar browser.
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try {
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if (url.origin === new URL(selfOrigin).origin) return null
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} catch {
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// Unparsable selfOrigin (never in practice): intercept defensively.
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}
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return url.href
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}
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/** Whether a left-click may be taken over (unmodified left click only). */
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export function isPlainLeftClick(event: { button: number; metaKey: boolean; ctrlKey: boolean; shiftKey: boolean; altKey: boolean }): boolean {
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return event.button === 0 && !event.metaKey && !event.ctrlKey && !event.shiftKey && !event.altKey
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}
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/**
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* Register the document-level click capture that funnels external links
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* into the sidebar browser. Returns the disposer (HMR-safe).
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*/
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export function registerLinkInterception(opts: {
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takeoverEnabled: () => boolean
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/** Open the sidebar browser tab at `url` (the caller resolves the session). */
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openInSidebar: (url: string) => void
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/** The GUI's own origin (window.location.origin at registration). */
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selfOrigin: string
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}): () => void {
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const onClick = (event: MouseEvent): void => {
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if (!isPlainLeftClick(event)) return
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if (event.defaultPrevented) return
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if (!opts.takeoverEnabled()) return
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const target = event.target
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if (target === null || typeof (target as Element).closest !== 'function') return
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const anchor = (target as Element).closest('a[href]') as HTMLAnchorElement | null
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if (anchor === null) return
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const url = shouldInterceptLink(anchor.href, opts.selfOrigin)
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if (url === null) return
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event.preventDefault()
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opts.openInSidebar(url)
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}
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document.addEventListener('click', onClick, true)
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return () => { document.removeEventListener('click', onClick, true) }
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}
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