Menghuan1918
29f162dac0
基于 PR #74 的颗粒度讨论向前兼容拓展服务化 API： - TabDescriptor 新增可选 urlTarget(url) 谓词：聊天/界面外链被拦截时按注册 顺序路由到第一个命中的插件 tab 类型（openTab({ type, url, title })）， 内置 browser 退居隐式兜底；SIDEBAR_FEATURES 追加 'urlTarget' - 浏览器链接设置改为二级菜单（齿轮弹窗）：新增 browserInterceptHttp （默认开）+ browserInterceptHttps（默认关）；browserInterceptLinks 保留为总闸（默认开，旧文档零迁移） - 拦截管线：registerLinkInterception 的 takeoverEnabled 改收解析后的 URL，协议/同源纯判定（shouldInterceptLink）签名不变 - 测试：matchUrlTarget（注册顺序/抛错吞掉/browser 永不命中）、jsdom 点击接管门控、parsePrefs 新字段默认值；全默认字面量同步 - 文档：设计文档 + AGENTS.md（字段/示例/设置键）+ README（外链分流）
74 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
74 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
|
|
* Chat/GUI external-link interception: clicking an http(s) link that points
|
|
* OUTSIDE the GUI (chat messages, tool rows, prose mentions) opens the
|
|
* sidebar instead of a new browser tab. Gated by the caller through
|
|
* `takeoverEnabled(url)` — the `browserInterceptLinks` master, the URL's
|
|
* protocol flag (`browserInterceptHttp` / `browserInterceptHttps`) and the
|
|
* target tab's enable switch — and a Ctrl/Cmd/Shift/Alt-modified click
|
|
* always bypasses the takeover so the user can still force a real browser
|
|
* tab.
|
|
*
|
|
* Only the GUI's OWN document is watched — links inside the browser tab's
|
|
* sandboxed iframe live in another document and never bubble here (and
|
|
* their clicks must keep working inside the sidebar).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/** The pure decision: the URL to open in the sidebar, or null to let the
|
|
* click fall through. Extracted so the policy is unit-testable without a
|
|
* DOM. `anchorHref` must be the ABSOLUTE href (`<a>.href` already is).
|
|
* The protocol/same-origin policy lives HERE; the prefs gates (master +
|
|
* protocol flags + target enablement) live in the caller's
|
|
* `takeoverEnabled(url)` callback. */
|
|
export function shouldInterceptLink(anchorHref: string, selfOrigin: string): string | null {
|
|
let url: URL
|
|
try {
|
|
url = new URL(anchorHref)
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null
|
|
}
|
|
if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return null
|
|
// Same-origin links are GUI-internal navigation (settings pages, tool
|
|
// docs) — never routed into the sidebar.
|
|
try {
|
|
if (url.origin === new URL(selfOrigin).origin) return null
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Unparsable selfOrigin (never in practice): intercept defensively.
|
|
}
|
|
return url.href
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Whether a left-click may be taken over (unmodified left click only). */
|
|
export function isPlainLeftClick(event: { button: number; metaKey: boolean; ctrlKey: boolean; shiftKey: boolean; altKey: boolean }): boolean {
|
|
return event.button === 0 && !event.metaKey && !event.ctrlKey && !event.shiftKey && !event.altKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Register the document-level click capture that funnels external links
|
|
* into the sidebar. Returns the disposer (HMR-safe).
|
|
*/
|
|
export function registerLinkInterception(opts: {
|
|
/** Whether the takeover may happen for THIS url (the caller's prefs
|
|
* gates: master switch, protocol flag, target enablement). */
|
|
takeoverEnabled: (url: URL) => boolean
|
|
/** Open the sidebar tab at `url` (the caller resolves the target type). */
|
|
openInSidebar: (url: string) => void
|
|
/** The GUI's own origin (window.location.origin at registration). */
|
|
selfOrigin: string
|
|
}): () => void {
|
|
const onClick = (event: MouseEvent): void => {
|
|
if (!isPlainLeftClick(event)) return
|
|
if (event.defaultPrevented) return
|
|
const target = event.target
|
|
if (target === null || typeof (target as Element).closest !== 'function') return
|
|
const anchor = (target as Element).closest('a[href]') as HTMLAnchorElement | null
|
|
if (anchor === null) return
|
|
const url = shouldInterceptLink(anchor.href, opts.selfOrigin)
|
|
if (url === null) return
|
|
if (!opts.takeoverEnabled(new URL(url))) return
|
|
event.preventDefault()
|
|
opts.openInSidebar(url)
|
|
}
|
|
document.addEventListener('click', onClick, true)
|
|
return () => { document.removeEventListener('click', onClick, true) }
|
|
}
|