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nihalashetty ae67bff5a3 feat: deep-agent canvas, live observability, and multi-environment tooling
Self-hosted platform for building, testing, and shipping LangChain/LangGraph agents. Deep-agent sub-agents on the canvas, a live tracing/observability timeline, auto-provisioned built-in tools with import/export, per-environment tool variables, streamed evaluations, and per-user auth token forwarding.
2026-07-28 01:49:19 +05:30

2.3 KiB

Security Policy

Forge is self-hosted and handles sensitive material — provider API keys, encrypted secrets, auth credentials, and outbound requests to your systems. We take security issues seriously.

Supported versions

Forge is pre-1.0 and under active development. Security fixes land on the main branch and are included in the next release. Please test against the latest main before reporting.

Version Supported
main (latest)
older tags (please upgrade)

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories (Repository → SecurityReport a vulnerability). This keeps the report confidential until a fix is available.

When reporting, include:

  • A description of the issue and its impact.
  • Steps to reproduce (a minimal proof-of-concept helps).
  • Affected component/version (commit SHA if possible).

Do not include real secrets, tokens, or customer data in your report — redact or use placeholders.

We aim to acknowledge reports promptly, keep you updated on remediation, and credit reporters (unless you prefer to remain anonymous) once a fix ships.

Built-in safeguards

Forge ships several defense-in-depth controls; when reporting, note if your finding bypasses one:

  • SSRF guard on every outbound call (tools, webhooks, fetch, crawl) — private, loopback, and cloud-metadata addresses are blocked by default.
  • Encrypted, reference-only secrets (secret://…) via a Fernet master key; secret values are write-only and never returned.
  • Production hardening guard that refuses to boot with default secrets, auth disabled, a non-durable checkpointer, or the SSRF guard off.
  • Multi-tenant isolation with query-level scoping and optional Postgres row-level security.
  • Sandboxed code tools (RestrictedPython) and origin-locked embed widgets.

Scope

In scope: the Forge API, web console, engine, tools/auth subsystems, and the container stack. Out of scope: vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report those upstream; tell us if Forge's usage makes them exploitable), and issues requiring a already-compromised host or admin credentials.