nihalashetty
ae67bff5a3
Self-hosted platform for building, testing, and shipping LangChain/LangGraph agents. Deep-agent sub-agents on the canvas, a live tracing/observability timeline, auto-provisioned built-in tools with import/export, per-environment tool variables, streamed evaluations, and per-user auth token forwarding.
58 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
58 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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Forge is self-hosted and handles sensitive material — provider API keys, encrypted
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secrets, auth credentials, and outbound requests to your systems. We take security issues
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seriously.
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## Supported versions
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Forge is pre-1.0 and under active development. Security fixes land on the `main` branch and
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are included in the next release. Please test against the latest `main` before reporting.
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| Version | Supported |
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|---|---|
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| `main` (latest) | ✅ |
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| older tags | ❌ (please upgrade) |
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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**Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.**
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Report privately via **[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/nihalashetty/Forge/security/advisories/new)**
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(Repository → *Security* → *Report a vulnerability*). This keeps the report confidential
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until a fix is available.
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When reporting, include:
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- A description of the issue and its impact.
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- Steps to reproduce (a minimal proof-of-concept helps).
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- Affected component/version (commit SHA if possible).
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**Do not include real secrets, tokens, or customer data** in your report — redact or use
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placeholders.
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We aim to acknowledge reports promptly, keep you updated on remediation, and credit
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reporters (unless you prefer to remain anonymous) once a fix ships.
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## Built-in safeguards
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Forge ships several defense-in-depth controls; when reporting, note if your finding
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bypasses one:
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- **SSRF guard** on every outbound call (tools, webhooks, fetch, crawl) — private,
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loopback, and cloud-metadata addresses are blocked by default.
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- **Encrypted, reference-only secrets** (`secret://…`) via a Fernet master key; secret
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values are write-only and never returned.
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- **Production hardening guard** that refuses to boot with default secrets, auth disabled,
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a non-durable checkpointer, or the SSRF guard off.
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- **Multi-tenant isolation** with query-level scoping and optional Postgres row-level
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security.
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- **Sandboxed code tools** (RestrictedPython) and origin-locked embed widgets.
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## Scope
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In scope: the Forge API, web console, engine, tools/auth subsystems, and the container
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stack. Out of scope: vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report those upstream;
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tell us if Forge's usage makes them exploitable), and issues requiring a
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already-compromised host or admin credentials.
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